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LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 52: No.1' broad public policy questions about the appropriate status of contracts in general. At a minimum, distinguishing situations in which contract provisions have strategic purpose from those in which such terms serve a more positive function becomes an important task.
Toward that end, this article begins by analyzing the efficiency and strategic roles of some common contractual provisions. In particular, we examine the assumptions underlying the results of both efficiency and strategic models of stipulated damage clauses and attempt to identify conditions conducive to using contracts for these conflicting purposes. Then, to gain insight into the practical motives and processes involved in designing contract terms and, particularly, to see whether there is evidence that these terms played a strategic role in actual settings, we examine a number of cases in which contracts involved stipulated damage or similar provisions affecting the incentives of a buyer to switch to an alternative supplier.
II

STIPULATED DAMAGES AND THE ECONOMICS OF CON-I"RACTING
The desire to design contract terms to promote efficient adaptation without the need for costly court intervention is the theme underlying most efficiency analyses of contracting. Given the substantial interval that often exists between the time a contract is entered into and executed, 6 significant changes in the environment surrounding the transaction are likely to occur, requiring adjustments in the behavior of the parties. Because contracts that stipulate the optimal response of each party to each conceivable contingency are too costly to write and enforce, transactors tend to rely on a combination of common law rules and relatively simple, easily enforced contract clauses to accommodate change.
Among a number of common contractual arrangements that have been interpreted in this light are two-part pricing schedules, 7 stipulated damage provisions,s and minimum bill contracts. 9 Each permits the quantity transacted under the contract to be adjusted in response to market conditions 6. Contract length varies with the nature and attributes of the transaction. Contracts extending ten years or more in length are common in some settings. Information on contract duration for particular industries and analyses of its determinants can be found in Joskow. 49 ECONOMETRICA 33 (1981) . However, we are restricting our attention here to relatively simple . pricing arrangements both to simplify the analysis and because they, unlike the more sophisticated arrangements, are commonly observed in practice.
and, by relating the incremental price paid by the buyer to the seller's incremental cost, establishes incentives to respond efficiently. Moreover, compared to more elaborate arrangements, these schemes are easy to write and enforce, usually requiring only properly authorized orders and receipts to verify performance. From an efficiency perspective, the reason transactors enter into long-term written contracts in the first place is to protect the relationship from strategic behavior in the form of either costly haggling over quasi-rents \0 or free-riding on services or information provided by one of the transactors. The former problem arises where one or both parties have invested in reliance. or relationship-specific assets, in support of the transaction. 1 1 Because such investments have a higher value in their intended use than in their next best use, parties have an incentive to engage in haggling or other forms of opportunism in hopes of influencing the distribution of the resulting quasirents. Contractual guarantees reduce the incidence of such behavior by restricting the ability of one party to extort concessions from the other by threatening not to perform. Free-riding, on the other hand, is a potential hazard, for example, where the cost of providing information or services associated with a purchase is included in the price of the product. If the unpriced service or information acquired from the original seller can be used with a competitor's product, the purchaser will have an incentive to avoid paying for the service by buying the product from a no-frills source. Contracts that restrict a purchaser's ability to use competing products can foster the development and provision of such services by suppliers. I!?
The notion that contracts are not deterrents to strategic behavior. but are instead strategic devices themselves, stands in sharp contrast to this view. Instead of constraining free-riding or haggling between the parties to an exchange, contracts are perceived as a means of restricting the actions of third parties, usually suppliers seeking to enter the market. Thus. those advocating a strategic view contend that two-part prices and stipulated damage provisions, instead of promoting efficient adjustment. establish entrance fees for rival firms, with the result that some low-cost firms are foreclosed from competing for business or deterred from entry.
In the remainder of this section, we examine how these competing theories interpret the use of stipulated damages. For purposes of analysis, stipulated damage provisions have the advantage of having received detailed attention from both the strategic perspective and the efficiency perspective, and also of being analytically tractable. The equivalence between stipulated damages and two-part pricing schemes in many settings also permits us to generalize our results to a broader class of contracts.
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A. Stipulated Damages and Efficient Breach
In models of efficient breach, IS parties to a contract face uncertainty about some dimension of the transaction that makes it possible that actual performance will not in fact be desirable ex post. The uncertainty may be about the seller's costs, the buyer's valuation, or the availability of alternative buyers or sellers.14 The critical element is that in some situations the joint surplus between contracting parties may be larger if they do not perform the contract as originally intended.
Recognizing this possibility, the courts generally permit one party to discharge an obligation by compensating the other for lost profits. To see that the lost-profit or "expectation" measure of damages leads to efficient breach, consider a setting in which the buyer's valuation, v, and the supplier's cost of production, c, of a particular input are determinate, but there is uncertainty about the cost, s(8), of acquiring supplies from an alternative source. If the cost of the alternative supplies falls below the price,p, agreed to in the contract (that is, s(8) < p) the buyer will wish to breach the contract with the original seller. Efficiency, however, requires that the buyer honor the contract with the original producer unless the cost of alternative supplies falls below the seller's opportunity cost, or s(8) < c. Thus, for values of s(8) that fall between the original seller's costs and the contract price (c < s(8) < P), the buyer will wish to breach even though breach is inefficient.
If the court sets damages, 0, equal to the seller's lost profits in the event of breach, or p-c, then the buyer would be encouraged to perform the contract when it is efficient to do so. Specifically, the buyer would breach only if
0, equal to the seller's lost profits would induce the buyer to breach when s(8) < c (see Figure 1 ). As illustrated, the buyer is given the incentive to buy from the low-cost supplier, which is, of course, efficient. efficient breach
More important for the issue at hand, the level of damages that would maximize expected joint profits, were the parties to choose to stipulate 13 ECON. 121 (1984) . The model to be described most closely follows Shavell. supra note 8.
14. See Shavell, supra note 8. at 474. damages in the contract rather than rely on the courts, is also lost profits.15
The reason that parties might choose to stipulate damages is to avoid the costly process of establishing court-determined awards where the seller's costs may be difficult for the court to assess but are reasonably stable and recognized by the parties at the time they enter the contract.
The advantages of stipulating in advance a sum payable as damages are manifold. For both parties, it may facilitate the calculation of risks and reduce the cost of proof. For the injured party. it may afford the only possibility of compensation for loss that is not susceptible of proof with sufficient certainty. For society as a whole, it may save the time of judles, juries. and witnesses. as well as the parties. and may cut the expense of litigation. 1
Finally, notice that the difference between the amount the buyer pays if the buyer performs the contract and the amount if the buyer breaches is p -(P-c) = c. In other words, expectation damages make the incremental cost of acquiring supplies from the seller equal to the seller's marginal cost. An equivalent way of writing the contract would be to adopt a two-part pricing schedule 17 stipulating a fixed component equal to the damage level identified above and a per-unit price equal to the seller's marginal cost. Hence, the generalization of the current analysis to that of two-part prices is straightforward.
Overall, circumstances in which there is (I) uncertainty about the buyer's alternatives and (2) relatively stable, though possibly unverifiable, costs of production are consistent with the efficient use of stipulated damages. As noted earlier, the desire to protect investments from free-riding or costly opportunistic haggling motivates the adoption of explicit contractual agreements in the first place. The duration of those agreements is likely to reflect the longevity of the investments and, where the distribution of rents is at issue, the degree to which the assets are specific to the relationship. IS 
B. Stipulated Damages as a Barrier to Entry
A recent article by Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton raises the possibility that contracts containing precisely the type of incentive provisions discussed above can be used strategically to create a barrier to entry.19 Indeed, the setting in which Aghion and Bolton develop their results is remarkably similar to the one associated with the efficient use of stipulated damages in the preceding section. 20 73. 79-91 (1976) .
19. Aghion & Bolton. supra note 4. 20. We examine in detail only one of two models contained in their paper. The second postulates contractual forms that. to the best of our knowledge. are not observed in practice. [Vol. 52: No.1 there is uncertainty about the costs, s(6), of acquiring supplies from an alternative source. Again, the parties face a choice of contract terms including the price and the level of damages to be stipulated in the contract.
Unlike the efficient breach models, parties in the strategic model optimally choose a damage provision in excess o/the seller's lost profits. As a result, the buyer is induced to deal with the incumbent seller too often relative _ to the optimum, thereby deterring entry by the rival for a range of costs over which entry would be efficient. Thus, despite similarities in the underlying environment, damage provisions, rather than promoting efficient breach, serve as a barrier to entry.
A closer inspection of the Aghion-Bolton model reveals the s'ource of this where the probability of breach. P, is Pr[s(6) < p -8],21 and pi is the marginal probability of P with respect to a change in p-8. 22 Thus the strategic model implies that the optimal penalty from the point of view of the parties is one that exceeds the lost profit measure by P / P'. 23 Given a contract price, p, permitting some entry gives the seller a positive probability (P > 0) of receiving an amount in damages. 8, greater than what the profits would be if the buyer performed, p-C. 24 In designing the contract, the 21. Th¢ new seller will cOler onlv if there exists a price, pe, above his costs. s(9), and below p -5. which will be true if .1(6) < P -fl. Hence, the probability of breach is Pr [s(6) 
22.-· See Appendix Infra. 23. Note that the equilibrium price in the strategic model will be lower than in the efficiency model to compensate the buyer for the higher strategic penalties. The result of the strategic model is that. given the contract price. the penalty chosen will be at a level that will induce too little breach relative to the efficient level.
24. Ifthe entrant's costs are uniformly distributed, damages would be set so that iis the average between the incumbent's costs. c, and the lowest possible value of s(6). Those familiar with the literature on optimal auctions will recognize that the damage provision is set so that p -& equals the optimal reserve price in an auction with symmetric bidders with independent private values. original transactors trade off the gains foregone when an efficient entrant is excluded against the lower price the new supplier must accept when entry does in fact occur. The result is that the buyer is induced to switch to the alternative seller too infrequently relative to the social optimum (see Figure  2 ). Unable to supply the buyer, a rival with costs between f and c is discouraged from entering.
The role of contracts in the strategic model is to create an entry barrier that extracts part of the potential gains from trade from rival firms. Using damages, this extraction is accomplished by setting a penalty for breach in excess of the efficient level; with a two-part pricing schedule, the same effect is achieved by setting a per-unit price below the incumbent's marginal cost. The duration of contracts, meanwhile, is limited only by the desire of the incumbent to signal the probability of entry. An incumbent who perceives a high probability of entry will want protection by writing a longer-term contrac-t, which the buyer will only agree to if the contract price is low; if the probability of entry is low, then the seller adopts shorter-term but higherprice agreements. 25
III REQ..UIREMENTS FOR THE STRATEGIC USE OF DAMAGE PROVISIONS
The source of the disparity in the results of the strategic and efficiency models of stipulated damages is readily apparent. Whereas the efficiency model presumes that new supplies are available at their true opportunity cost, the strategic model assumes the new supplier charges a price just sufficient to get the buyer to switch. In the latter case, the original transactors can extract some of the entrant's expected rents by stipulating "excessive" damage levels that "commit" the buyer to rejecting bids above f. The potential inefficiency of excluding an entrant with costs between f and c arises because the original transactors cannot discriminate between high-cost and low-cost entrants.
For this strategy to be successful, two factors are critical: (1) the contract must credibly commit the parties not to deal with the entrant except on the terms of the contract; and (2) the entrant must be able to earn positive economic rents by serving the customer, that is, the firm must expect to be 
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LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 52: No.1 able to earn a return on its assets in excess of their value in their next best alternative use. This section evaluates these two requirements in turn.
A. Commitment and the Law of Contracts
The importance of commitment in the strategic model can be seen by examining the original transactors' optimal response to entry in the absence of a binding agreement. Before an entrant made a bid, the original transactors would have no specific information about the entrant's actual costs, leaving the parties in the position of a non-discriminating monopolist. 26 Although it would be in the interest of the parties to announce their intention to reject bids below s~ once a bid was made the parties' incentives to accept or reject that bid would change. An entrant who met the transactor's reserve price would reveal, by this action, that the entrant's costs were no higher than f and were probably lower. The original transactors could exploit this information to appropriate a larger share of the entrant's expected rents by demanding funher price concessions. On the other hand, if no bid were made, the original transactors would have an incentive to raise the minimum acceptable price. 27 Thus, although a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer would maximize the expected profits of the original buyer and seller, their ex post incentive to alter the terms exposes the need for a mechanism to discourage deviations from the original terms. If take-it-or-Ieave-it offers lack sufficient commitment, then bargaining processes will determine between whom and at what price exchange will take place. 28 The mechanism ostensibly serving to commit the parties to their best takeit-or-Ieave-it offer in the strategic model is contracting. Indeed, as long as the damage provision described in the model is enforceable, the buyer will be prevented from switching to the new supplier at bids above f. Notice, however, that constraining the buyer's ability to accept price offers is not enough. Since the incumbent can avoid production costs, c, by procuring supplies from the lower-cost entrant, subcontracting produces gains whenever s(6) < c. Thus, for the contract successfully to deter entry, it must also limit the ability of the seller to deal with the entrant. 26 . A "non-discriminating" monopolist (or, in the case of a single buyer, monopsonist) offers the same terms to all traders. According to the strategic model, the original transactors choose contract terms that do not take account of the entrant's actual costs. In contrast. a "discriminating" monopolist would set terms of trade that vary with known characteristics of other panies.
27. Lack of commitment raises a technical problem with the strategic model. Anticipating that the original seller and buyer have the incentive to take a stronger position once entry has taken place, no supplier would enter. But this is inconsistent with the parties' expectations that the original contract be profit-maximizing. Hence, unless the contract constrains not only concessions but also new demands on the pan of the original contractors. the model does not have an equilibrium. We thank Naveen Khanna for bringing this point to our attention.
28. Reputation for adhering to such offers might assist an incumbent seller in its strategy, but several factors, including the infrequency of this type of interaction. suggest that reputation would not be a reliable source of commitment. In addition. the ability of the buyer to establish a reputation for integrating new supply sources would provide the buyer with a dominant strategy. A crucial issue then becomes. whether contracts in fact· serve the commitment function postulated in the strategic model. An examination of applicable laws. governing contracts suggests that they may not. First, contracts generally pennit a supplier to meet. contractual obligations by offering substitute perfonnance. The .
•. Unifonn .Commercial Code, for example, describes "both d~legation of perfonnance and assignability as nonnal arid pennissible incidents' of a contract for the sale of goods. "29 Thus, the incumbent seller is nonnally at liberty to delegateperfonnance or, alternativety,to procure supplies from. a third party.30 In this respect, a contract can be thought of as mainly affecting who negotiates with the lowcost supplier, rather than whether such negotiation can take place. 31
Second, the law sconfers on the parties to a contract the right to modify or rescind the tenns of their agreement by mutuaLconsent. 32 By splitting the gains from dealing with the entrant three ways instead of two. the position of both parties to the contract can be improved relative to the status quo, satisfying a necessary condition for a modification to be negotiated and accepted. . The incentive to renegotiate once an entrant has made a bid weakens the credibility of take-it-or . . ;}eave-itoffers by the incumbents. Thus, even a "no substitute performance" clause is likely to fall to the ex post mutual interests of the parties. , Finally, although the common law gives the parties the latitude to stipulate damages. it is an established rule of law that damages must be reasonable "in light of the anticipated. or actual loss caused by the breach."33 Stipulated damages in excess of this level are regarded as penalties and are therefore unenforceable. 54 If the courts restrict damages to the efficient level, supply by the low-cost provider will occur no matter what share of the .gains from trade . can be 'commanded for the entrant's prodUCt. Thus, in principle, the common 29. U.C.C. § 2 .. 21,0 comment 1 (1978) . Set also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1979) ("Delegation of Performance of Duty").
30. The principal exceptions to this rule relate to' contracts for personal services and to contracts for the exercise of personal skill or discretion~:and contracts in which delegation is prohibited by prior agreement. Even the latter may be voided if the; terms are deemed contrary to the public interest; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1979) .
31. To the extent that contracts between automobile manufacturers and dealers restrict the ability of the dealers to carry competing manufacturers' products. American company dealings with low-cost foreign mamlfacturers are modest evidence of this practice.
32. 5eelJ;C.C. § 2-209(978). 33. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979) . 34.. The use of the terms "liquidated damages" and "penalties" refiects legal conclusions as to whether stipulated damages are reasonable. SeeU.C.C .. § 2-718 comment 1. The courts frequently rely on the principle that allowable damages to the seller correspond ,to the lost profits from breach. In David.8cDavid. Inc. v. Myerson. 277 F. Supp; 973 (1966) , the court found enforceable the requirement .that a buyer take specified minimum quantities of a new product or reimburse the patent holder for any price reductions on sales to others.; Similarly. in International Electronics Corp. v. United States, 646 F.2d 496 (Ct. Cl. 1981 In practice, of course, these common law impediments to strategic contracting do not make moot the issue of anticompetitive foreclosure. Challenging the legality of stipulated damages, like any legal action, is certain to impose some non-recoverable enforcement costs on the plaintiff. These costs include the obvious, such as witness time and attorney's fees, but may also include damages to the plaintiff's reputation that make other parties less willing to deal with the plaintiff in the future. The threat of such costs may deter a breaching party from filing suit to reduce damages. In addition, courts may choose to err in favor of the contract where the incumbent's costs are particularly difficult to ascertain, as is likely to be the case where damages were indeed stipulated for efficiency reasons. S5 Nevertheless, several factors weigh against the survival of the penalty. First, the reality that strategic damages exceed lost profits where the provisions were chosen strategically favors the complainant in a trial of fact. Second, the savings to a buyer from dealing with a low-cost supplier provide the buyer with the incentive to seek relief from contractual penalties; the greater the inefficiency, the greater the gains to successful litigation and the larger the incentive to sue. Finally, litigation represents the last and probably least likely process through which to achieve a reduction in the penalty, given the mutual gains to a negotiated modification.
In sum, the ability to use contracts strategically may be undermined in any of several ways. The presumed legality of delegated performance, the illegality of penalties, and the potential for ex post agreements either to raise or to lower the entry fee all tend to undermine the credibility of the threat not to deal with the entrant except on the terms of the contract. In practice, the use of contracts as a barrier to entry must be accompanied by: (I) restrictions on the delegation of performance imposed by either the nature of the work or an explicit provision to prevent the seller from dealing with the entrant; and (2) high litigation and bargaining costs to prevent a legal or negotiated adjustment to the contract. Raising the costs of switching will deter some switching, but the resulting inefficiencies represent as much a failure in negotiations as market foreclosure. Indeed, the economic literature on incentive compatibility sometimes refers to the type of inefficiency generated 35 . In deciding whether a stipulated damage clause is enforceable. the courts consider. in addition to the relatio.nship between stipulated damages and anticipated or actual losses. two other factors: (1) the intent of the parties. and (2) the precision with which actual losses can be estimated. The courts try to ascertain whether the parties intended payment of damages in lieu of performance or intended that the damages would compel performance. If the court finds the latter. the damage provision is a penalty and not enforceable. 
B. Entry and Economic Rents
In addition to these commitment requirements, the abilitv to use cont . II d d h h' h ; racts strategtca y epen s on t e extent to w IC the damage provisions alter th entranfs price. The less power the entrant has to set price, the less th: advantage in stipulating an excessive damage. To the extent, for example that the buyer wields pure bargaining power to some degree over the ne~' supplier, the incentive to use contracts for strategic purposes is mitigar.ed. In the extreme, if the new supplier is unable to charge a price above marginal costs, the optimal damage becomes the efficient one. 37 The latter sltuation would occur, for instance, if the uncertainty about s (6) represented fluctuations in the price of a market substitute. In that case. competition would keep the entranf s price at marginal cost and thereby eliminate the incentive to design contracts strategically.38
In the Aghion-Bolton model, there is only a single entrant who has. in effect, full power to set price at the buyer's reservation value. This raises a basic question about the nature of entry. Since the entrant expects Dositive profits, why are other firms not attracted to the market? If the costs of entry are the same for all firms and it makes sense for one firm to enter, then it would also make sense for any firm. Competition for contracts to serve the buyer would guarantee that all expected rents accrue to the buver.
For an entrant to expect an above-normal return, differential barri<:'rs to entry are required. 39 In other words, the entrant must han:, J discrete advantage over other potential suppliers. generating the possibility of ,arning economic rents. Ifthe source of that advantage also reveals the identit·\ of the firm best situated to enter the market, however. the buyer has an incentive to integrate this supplier into the firm. By internalizing the rents accruing to "entry," such vertical integration eliminates the complicity of the bu\'er. At a minimum, the possibility of internalizing production limits the potcntial rents of an independent supplier.
In general, the existence of competition to supply the buyer undcrmines the possibility of using contracts strategically. In order for stipulated damages to serve strategic purposes, it is necessary to have some f(lrm of differential barrier to entry in addition to the commitment requi;-ements discussed above. Even then. bargaining power on the part of the buyer reduces both the incentive to set excessive penalties and the amount of entry actually deterred. [Vol. 52: No.1
IV EVIDENCE OF THE STRATEGIC USE OF DAMAGES
A number of studies have examined actual contracting practices and offered plausible efficiency rationales for observed provisions. 40 Studies scrutinizing contracts for strategic effect, however, are relatively scarce. To get a sense for whether the conditions necessary for strategic use of contracts are common in practice, we examined a sample of antitrust cases in which the design and duration of the contracts played a role. Such a sample is probably not representative of contracting practices in general, but, rather, is biased toward a finding of strategic effect.
Our search revealed only five reported decisions in which stipulated damage provisions or multi-part pricing schemes were alleged to exclude efficient rivals. 41 The paucity of cases may reflect a variety of factors, one of which is the recent vintage of the literature on strategic use of these provisions. With respect to stipulated damages, the lack of enforceability of penalties may also be a significant factor. On the other hand, the infrequency may indicate that the underlying conditions required for anti competitive exclusion to occur (the ability of entrants to earn positive profits, the reliance on non-discriminatory commitments by incumbents, the inability to verify the entrant's costs) are in fact uncommon.
Although the cases often involved additional concerns, in keeping with our preceding analysis, our discussion concentrates on whether the circumstances of each case permit a strategic interpretation of the contract provisions, or whether efficiency considerations (either investments in relationship-specific assets or free-rider problems) serve better to explain the use and design of the [Vol. 52: No. 1 were predato~' and that the cancellation clause was exclusionary. In particular. Barry'argued that the cancellation provisions compelled contract performance and, except' to the extent that Grinnell's needs exceeded the dollar amounts specified in' ltscol1tract 'with Pacific, effectively excluded Barry. Although on the surface the~e'facts fit the Aghion;'Boltoh scenario, the record tevealsimportantdetails that bear on the nature and purpose of the contracts. First, the history of the relations among the patties and their behavior provides a rich example Qf real-world bargaining. In particular, Grinnell's actions prior tosigilirig the Contracts with Pacific show clearly that Grinnen was not a passive buyer whose agreements with Pacific were intended toexdude Barry as:3 second source. On the contrary, Grinnell was an active participant in ,Barry :sefforts· to· produce mechanical snubbers.
~i\.s nmed earlier,·Grinnell became. a major customer of Pacific when the market rurnedfromhydraulic to mechanical snubbers. During this period, Grinndlattempted to deve10pitsowrism~bber production capability,49 but, having failed atthe·se attempts, sought to have Barry,·whichhad previously produced a mechanical· snubber prototype for· aerospace applications, manufacture snubbers for Grinnelrs use: In:c:ieed, the terms of the agreement between Grinnell and Barry resembled a joint venture. 50 non~dis<;riminatory final off~rs. Moreover, attempts to, enter the industry came either ciirecdy from ,Grinnell,or with GrinneU'sdirect participation. In paying B~rTy's clevelopm~Ilt CO §!S ~ndi siipulatiIlg per .. unit prices ex ante, Grinnell' a~sur~d itselfprices at ()r near, Barry's ,margined costs. Under such circumstaIlces,it is unlikely that GnnneU'W'0uld have acquiesced to contracts designed to 'extract the surpliisfrom that arrangement, whkh accrued mainly to itself. ) , -,
Second., it appears thattb.e contract generatedc~st ~avings forPaeific. The ,production ofsnubbersin~9lved tags of about six months between orders and 'delivery. The court. recorp establishes that Pacific realized substantial economiestrol1l~~ing able lotely ana high level of production: "The p~ice discount, by securing the firyn order,aIlowedPacific to operate [at] this capacity more, efficiently., .sa~ed ~a'Sificmohey,al1d thereby pr()duced more profit thana higherprice (witnOlil the fim} order) co,uldhave don~, without regard to any impact on Barry. "53 Nor-oidthe duration of the contracts seem excessive in light of the~e lags and th~small-numbers negotiating setting in which they were "'ritten. 54 Grirtnell\'exhibiteci reluctance to enter the contracts with Pacific was eroded only asit became increasingly evident that 'Barry would notbecdme a viable second source. In fact, Grinnell agreed to large-volume, long..;term agreements with. Pacific only after it had become umnis-takably clear that Barry wouldbeuriable to produce an acceptable substitute within "any reasohableperiod. . An additional) consider;nlon waS the nauire and effect of the cancellation Clause' in the contract'between Grinnell and' Pacific,' which was a matter of dispute among the litigants.Whife Barry claimed the clause required' Grinnell to pay {or '100 pe~cent of its obligations to 'Pacific upon cancellation of the contract, the district court concluded:
--
[I]t is clear tflat blanket purchase ()rdersoftlt~ty,pe executed by Pacific and Grinnell in January andJuly, 1977. were agreements governing price only. No firm obligations of the'seller to deliver and the buyer to pay for the good atoseuotil.specifie purchase orders were ' . submitted,. If Jhe agreed. uponminimums\Vere not ordered. the agreed upon discounts would be withdrawn, and lh~purchaseiw(i)Uld be ,oblig'lted to pay at standard rates for products actually ordered and delivered. 55 ',. .
If this interpretation of the cancellation provisions of the contract is correct,dle 'effectivepen~lty for reducing orders, ahd thus the contract's potential for exclusion, is substantially lessened~ For the incentive provisions of the contract to exclude a more efficient rival, the effective contract price 53.' Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 236. 54. District Court Judge Skinnerconclua~&' .
It~eems to me to be ari' elttraqrdinaryexteusion on (sic),antitrust theory to hold a noncancellable clause in a ope-year purcha~e contract iII~gal Ilecause [ft.dfillrnent is) not economically inevitable. I have found no case so holding, and I rule that the imposition of this clause, given the history of the relations between Grinnell and Pacific, and Pacific's legitimate desire to plan its production for at least a year, is not illegal exclusionary conduct [Vol. 52: No.1 would have to be below the marginal costs of the incumbent. Whereas a 100 percent minimum bill requirement would have satisfied that condition, the volume-based quantity discounts left price substantially above marginal costs over all but a 5 to 10 percent range of the contract minimum. 56 Although the cancellation provisions in this case were held to be nonexclusionary, the appellate court underscored the general point that even if Pacific did try to use the cancellation clause to compel performance, the provision would represent a penalty and would not be enforceable. 57 The court acknowledged the concern that the provision's "presence does still threaten the buyer with the lawsuit that would be needed to prove that it is unenforceable. And it is this threat, and the consequent additional deterrence to the 'breach and pay damages' course of action that constitutes the 'unreasonable anticompetitive' aspect of the clause."58 But the court found this argument to be inapplicable in this case: "Given Grinnell's size and the competence of its legal staff, it is most unlikely to have been deterred by Pacific's assertion of unusually high damages resting upon a legally invalid provision in the contract. "59 When examined in detail, Barry v. Grinnell serves, in our opinion, to demonstrate a number of the obstacles to using contracts strategically and the hazards of entertaining claims of exclusion based on contract damages. A buyer facing a sole supplier has considerable incentive to promote development of alternative sources, through either outside suppliers or integrated production and, as long as those prospects remain viable, would be understandably reluctant to commit itself to dealing with an incumbent supplier for an extended period. The analysis also reinforces the tenuous legal status of the terms needed to support exclusion. Parties have an incentive to challenge. and courts frequently invalidate, cancellation provisions perceived to penalize the breacher. Finally, the case between Barry and Grinnell effectively illustrates the potential for abuse of the antitrust laws by opportunistic agents. 60 The prospect of treble damages was enough to induce a clearly high-cost rival like Barry to file against its former partner.
56. The court found the discounted prices "generated revenues more than sufficient to cover the total cost of producing the goods to which they applied," a finding that Barry did not dispute. 64. The effect of the mi.niInum monthly fee was to lower the implied marginal cost of using a machine atoperatirig levels below 25 percent of capacity. . United lea.sed mo~t 'ofit's machines, a practice that may reflect its customers' preferences, as leasi~g made it "easy for a person with modest capital and of something less than superior efficiency to become a shoe manufacturer." /d. at 323. But. as is well understood, by leasing, a manufacturer retains control over the secondary market and as a result maybe better able to exploit its demand. In support of this view, the record cites t.hat United purchased used machines only to dispose of them. '[d. at 33.3-34 (from 1931 to 1942" United spent approximately $350,000 for used machinery that apparently ~:as nOI resold or leased).
67 . Carl Kaysen states:
Exi5liIlg rivals in the, machinery market do .not appear to constitute a significant limitation on United's power. The sample of shoe factories revealed 22 known competitors. the largest ofwhic~ was Compo, with 3.4 per cent of the tqtal number of major machines in the sample inventory and the second largest,lntern<iltional Sho(Machinery Corp., with 0.6 per cent of the total number of machines. C. KAYSEN, supra note 62, at 52., .lJnitedShoe'~ dominant market position was due to a combination of numerous acquisiti0l'ls and mergers ana internal growth, as discussed briefly by the district court, United Shoe, 222F. at 349, and in more detail in C;. KAvSEN. supra note 62.
68. The district court stated that while United Shoe had over 2000 patents for shoe machinery equipment. most of its important .Patents had expired. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 332-33~ The [Vol. 52: No.1 settled dispute between Citicorpand Western Union,78 arid the second relates to the role of license fees in litigation overIBM's leases for plug-compatible peripheral components. 79
The dispute between Citicorp Services, Inc., and. Western Union Telegraph Co. offers another example of the use of "exclusionary" contracts to protect against fr~~ riding. by an entI;ant on manufacturer-provided services. Attempting to establish itself in the "public money transfer" business,Citicorp had enlisted Western Union agents to act also as Citicorp agents, offering commission rates above Western Union's as an inducement. In response, western Union: (l) imposed exclusive dealing contracts on some of its .} 0,500 outlets; (2) termlilated' some' outlets that agreed to act as Citicorp agents; and (3) . denied 'other dual ageIlts the right to handle other Westeni Union services.
Although Citicorp alleged that these actions prevented it from entering the moiley transfer market, the actions can be interpreted as consistent with the manufacturer-services rationale for exclusive dealing and switching penalties. In establishing an effective network, Western Union needed to identify suitable agents and locatioIls over an extensive geographic region, as well as advertise the existence and qualities of its service. Quite clearly, Western Union was vulnerable to free riding on its efforts to attraCt customers and :agents, if the . latter . were also allowed to offer Citicorp services. By relying on Western Union's advertising and locations, Citicorp could lure away both customers and agents with more favorable terms without incurring comparable' costs. . . . The IBM litigation focused on IBM's announcement in May of 1971 of its fixed-term leasing plan for plug-compatible peripherals. Several rivals o~iected to IBM's' reduCtions in' rental rates and to their new one-and twoyear leases. The leases offered discounts of up to 10 percent on monthly rates and imposed return fees that in the two~year leases, for instance, equaled five times the monthly rental if the lease was'tenninated in the first twelve months, and two and one-half times that amount in the second year. so Again, the facts of the case make it difficult to impute a strategic motive to IBM. First, the leases were introduced after several competitors had already established themselves in the peripheral market and in response to significantly lower prices by the entrants. 81 IBM's lease terms themselves were similar to the terms offered by competitors and, according to the courts involved in this litigation. were commonplace commercial agreements. 82 . DESIGN AND DURATION OF CONTRACTS 83 Moreover, by u §ing longer leases, IBM, like its competitors, avoided costly "chuming"of machines and succeeded in reducing its costS.8S
. Perhaps more important, the IBM case illustrates the potential for misuse 'of the private antitrust remedy that could arise if theories of exClusion based on the use of contract provision werege~erally accepted. Such theories would· allow cQmpetitor,plaintiifs who were "excluded" merely because of competition to /bring . . Sherman Act section 2 claims. Even if the courts . eventually reject meritless claims of exclusion,. the costs of applying rule-ofreason an,alyses to the questions of strategic use of contracts could restrict incumbents' responses to entry and, perversely, could sustain entry by less efficient suppliers. Thus, establishing antitrust liability based on the strategic model would involve a tradeoff between exclusion of more efficient entrants and restrictions on more efficient· incumbents.
The conditions under which contracts can be used strategically. are fairly restrictive. First, a new stippliermust. expect to earn excess rents upon winning the customer's business. Where the market for substitute . performa.nce is populated with homogeneous firms, competition among them to serve the buyer keeps price near marginal costs, eliminating the strategic motive of the original contracting parties. For there to be expected rents from entry, some firms must be substantially better situated to enter than others. Even then, the possibility of integrating the low-cost supplier reduces the threat of strategic deterrence. Finally, there is both theoretical support and casual evidence for the contrary conclusion that buyers. if anything, are likely to maintain even inefficient producers as second sources to gain leverage in bargaining with incumbents. 84 When the economic conditions for the strategic use of contracts are present, the law presents a number of obstacles to deterring entry through contracts. First, the common law treatment of excessive damages undermines directly the ability of parties to use contracts strategically. In addition, rules regarding delegation of performance and mutual modification mitigate, if not eliminate, the commitment required to prevent the parties from striking deals, either unilaterally or in concert, with a more efficient supplier. In these respects; at least, the law of contract supports efficient outcomes. Indeed. the results, of the Aghion-Bolton model provide an additional reason not previously identified in the literature for why court invalidation of contract penalties is a sensible legal precept. 85 83, Telex, 367 F, Supp, Findings F89a and FIOO) 
84
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 52: No. 1 Our. review of antitrust cases relating to the issue of contract exclusion further supports a cautious approach to exclusionary claims. Despite a presJ,imptive bias toward a finding of strategic effect, the small setaf cases that dealW:ith exclusion. through use of stipulated damages . op their~equivalent fails to . substantiate the. purported dangers· of exclusionary .. contracts. Often, behavior or conditions necessary for successful exclusion are absent. The record of dealings in Barry Wright, for instance, illustrates the process of complicated negotiations and rivalry that often characterizes small-number supplier-customer relations.....;and contradicts the take-it-oi4eave-itcontract commitment essential to the theory. In every case, moreover,the' contract provisions. in question haves6und efficiencyraticmales> What·stance should the antitrust laws take toward stipulated damage and related contractual provisions in light of these findings? A central question is whether the courts can devise market tests or screens to identify when contract provisions are likely to be used strategically and when they enhance efficiency by properly aligning incentives. 86 Even if such tests can be . developed, whether courts should subject such provisions to a rule-of-reason analysis as a general policy depends on ~h~costs of applying the rule, both in terms of enforcement and in lerms of the impairment of efficiency. The inclination of firms to use the antitrust treble damCige remedy to impose costs on rivals suggests that a substantial:~hreshold should be established before provisions, widely recogn~zed to enhance efficiency in many circumstances, are exposed to critical legal review becaus,e of'conceivable strategic uses. 63 TEX. 1.. RE\". I (I9R4).
ApPENDIX
In this appendix, we derive the optimal stipulated damage provIsIon between a risk-neutral buyer and seller. The privately optimal choice of contract terms is that which maximizes the expected joint profits of the transactors, subject to the buyer's ex post decision of whether to perform the contract. Using the notation in the text, the buyer breaches whenever v -pe -5 > v -p. The seller, in tum, receives p-c if the contract is performed and 5 if the buyer breaches. Since the buyer will switch only if pe ~p -5, and it will be in the entrant's interest to enter only if pe 2.. 5(8), the probability of breach is Pr [5(8) 
Suppose that the price received by the entrant is ultimately a matter of negotiation and falls somewhere between p-5 and 5(8). Then letting a characterize the outcome of those negotiations, the entrant's price can be written as pe = a(p -5) + (l-a)5(8), where a E [0,1] and may be thought of as a parameter reflecting the bargaining strength of the entrant relative to the buyer. If a = I, the entrant has all the bargaining power and pe = p-5; if a = 0, the buyer has all of the bargaining power and pe =5(8) . Letting P represent the probability of breach, the. incumbent seller's expected profits would be .
1T' S = (l-P) (P-c) + P5
and the buyer's p -8 1T' B -(1 -P) (v -P) + I (V-pe -8) p'ds(e) o
Maximizing the sum of these two expressions with respect to b yields the following first-order condition:
Rewriting this expression yields 8 = P -( + a..p.
In other words, when a = I and the entrant is able to extract all the rents from entry (the Aghion-Bolton assumption), the optimal stipulated damage between the parties exceeds the lost-profit level. When Cl = 0 and the entrant is unable to charge a price above opportunity cost (as in the efficient breach . model), the optimal penalty reduces to 5 = p-c, the ex post efficient level.
